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Two recent publications reporting the
creation of ferret-transmissible influenza
A/H5N1 viruses [1,2] are controversial
examples of research that aims to produce,
sequence and characterize ‘‘potential pan-
demic pathogens’’ (PPPs) [3], novel infec-
tious agents with known or likely efficient
transmission among humans, with signifi-
cant virulence, and for which there is
limited population immunity. There is a
quantifiable possibility that these novel
pathogens could be accidentally or delib-
erately released. Exacerbating the immu-
nological vulnerability of human popula-
tions to PPPs is the potential for rapid
global dissemination via ever-increasing
human mobility. The dangers are not just
hypothetical. The H1N1 influenza strain
responsible for significant morbidity and
mortality around the world from 1977 to
2009 is thought to have originated from a
laboratory accident [4].
Risk evaluations surrounding biomedi-
cal research have not kept pace with
scientific innovations in methodology and
application. This gap is particularly dis-
concerting when research involves the
construction of PPPs that pose risks of
accidental release and global spread. We
argue here that accepted principles of
biomedical research ethics present a high
bar to PPP experiments, requiring that
risks arising from such experiments be
compensated by benefits to public health
not achievable by safer approaches. Fo-
cusing on influenza, the object of most
current PPP experimentation, we further
argue that there are safer experimental
approaches that are both more scientifi-
cally informative and more straightfor-
ward to translate into improved public
health through enhanced surveillance,
prevention, and treatment of influenza.
Influenza ‘‘Gain of Function’’
Experiments: Prototypical
Examples of Potential Pandemic
Pathogen Studies
Although several pathogens may be
categorized as PPPs (see Box 1), ‘‘gain of
function’’ experiments involving influenza
strains modified to be PPPs are expanding
[5–7] (Box 2), and hence of immediate
concern. In addition to the two contro-
versial studies recently published, studies
with H5N1 [8], H7N9 [9], and H7N1
[10] have used similar ferret passage
protocols, while still others have created
mammalian-transmissible strains in vitro,
followed by in vivo analysis [11,12].
Related studies have genetically combined
less pathogenic zoonotic avian viruses,
such as H9N2, with human seasonal
influenza viruses to generate strains that
exhibit enhanced transmissibility, and to
which humans would be immunologically
susceptible [13–15].
These studies have typically been con-
ducted in biosafety level (BSL) 3 or 3+
containment facilities. Laboratory-associat-
ed infections in BSL3 facilities are conser-
vatively estimated to occur at a rate of
two per 1,000 laboratory-years [3,16] in
the United States, where protocols and
enforcement are relatively stringent. Glob-
ally, high-containment laboratories have
variable standards and enforcement [17].
Experimentation in less-regulated or un-
regulated laboratories, with the attendant
risks of accidental or deliberate release,
is facilitated by the publication of
sequence and functional data on PPPs,
even if the original research was conduct-
ed with state-of-the-art safety and security
[18].
From the conservative estimate of the
rate of laboratory-associated infections of
two per 1,000 laboratory-years [3,16], it
follows that a moderate research program
of ten laboratories at US BSL3 standards
for a decade would run a nearly 20% risk
of resulting in at least one laboratory-
acquired infection, which, in turn, may
initiate a chain of transmission. The
probability that a laboratory-acquired
influenza infection would lead to extensive
spread has been estimated to be at least
10% [19]. Simple branching process
models suggest a probability of an out-
break arising from an accidental influenza
infection in the range of 5% to 60%
[20,21]. Such probabilities cannot be
ignored when multiplied by the potential
devastation of an influenza pandemic
[22,23], even if the resulting strain were
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virulence of highly pathogenic influenza
A/H5N1 [24], the subject of much of the
published PPP work to date. We advocate
a dispassionate review of pertinent evi-
dence and calculations of the probabilities
and magnitudes of potential risks pa-
rameterized for specific PPP research
programs.
Ethical Frameworks for Novel
Potential Pandemic Pathogens
Thus far, experiments with novel PPPs
have been assessed in the context of ‘‘dual
use research of concern’’ (DURC), a
designation for ‘‘research that could be
used for good or bad purposes’’ [25].
Within the broader category of DURC,
PPP experimentation raises ethical issues
that deserve more extensive evaluation
than other DURC, because the scale of
risk posed by PPPs is much greater. While
DURC by definition presents a risk of
malevolent use, the impact of the accidental
release of many agents involved in
DURC—anthrax, hemorrhagic fever vi-
ruses, and, most recently, a novel Clostrid-
ium botulinum toxin [26,27] –is constrained
by transmission mode or limited host
susceptibility. The magnitude of accidental
risk for a novel PPP is much greater.
The Nuremberg Code, a seminal doc-
ument in clinical research ethics, specifies
that in research conducted on human
participants, ‘‘the degree of risk to be
taken should never exceed that deter-
mined by the humanitarian importance
of the problem to be solved by the
experiment.’’ More broadly, 74 national
academies of science have stated: ‘‘Scien-
tists have an obligation to do no harm.
They should always take into consider-
ation the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of their own activities’’ [28]. The
ethical principles underlying both guide-
lines would seem to apply a fortiori to
research that imposes far-reaching risk to
the public [29]. Given the global nature of
influenza transmission, and thus implica-
tions beyond a country’s borders, interna-
tional agreement regarding acceptable
risks is needed.
Ethical constructs and risk evaluations
must be tailored to scientific advances in
methodology and application. Limited
attention has been paid to the ethics of
scientific experiments that pose risks
beyond identified human participants
[30–32]. On a practical level, however,
the spirit of the Nuremberg Code’s
‘‘humanitarian importance’’ criterion is
embodied in the recent frameworks for
evaluating PPP experiments from the US
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS), the primary sponsor of such
experiments to date. The HHS frame-
works for studies anticipated to create
mammalian-transmissible H5N1 [33] and
H7N9 [34,35] viruses specify that the risks
and benefits should be weighed.
The Nuremberg Code’s second point
states: ‘‘The experiment should be such as
to yield fruitful results for the good of
society, unprocurable by other methods or
means of study, and not random and
unnecessary in nature.’’ When projecting
the benefits of experiments that put
human life at risk, therefore, it is critical
to compare against alternatives. What
unique public health benefits do PPP
experiments offer relative to the
benefits of investing equivalent resources
Box 1. Scope for Heightened Ethical Scrutiny of Potential
Pandemic Pathogen Experiments
This article describes the responsible ethical scrutiny that should be applied to
experimental studies creating or employing PPPs. We define PPPs as infectious
agents with four characteristics:
1. Having known or likely efficient transmission among humans
2. Significantly virulent
3. Unmitigated by preexisting population immunity
4. Genetically distinct from pathogens currently circulating
These criteria define pathogens on which experimentation would pose a risk of
sparking a pandemic, placing the human population at risk of morbidity or
mortality, over and above the background risk of a naturally occurring pandemic.
The paradigm case is the creation of variants of influenza A/H5N1 that are readily
transmissible between ferrets, a model for human transmission. Such criteria
would likely be applicable to experimentation with human isolates of smallpox or
SARS, since these pathogens are no longer known to be circulating naturally. In
the future, the list may expand [57].
We do not advocate the necessity of heightened scrutiny for isolation and
characterization of naturally occurring pathogens, such as wild-type H5N1 or
H7N9, consistent with the HHS framework for evaluating gain-of-function studies
of H5N1 viruses, which exempts characterization of naturally occurring viruses
[33].
Summary Points
N ‘‘Gain of function’’ experiments involving the creation and manipulation of
novel potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) deserve ethical scrutiny regarding
the acceptability of the risks of accidental or deliberate release and global
spread.
N The Nuremberg Code, a seminal statement of clinical research ethics, mandates
that experiments that pose a risk to human life should be undertaken only if
they provide humanitarian benefits that sufficiently offset the risks and if these
benefits are unachievable by safer means.
N A novel PPP research program of moderate size would pose substantial risks to
human life, even optimistically assuming a low probability that a pandemic
would ensue from a laboratory accident.
N Alternative approaches would not only be safer but would also be more
effective at improving surveillance and vaccine design, the two purported
benefits of gain-of-function experiments to create novel, mammalian-transmis-
sible influenza strains.
N A rigorous, quantitative, impartial risk–benefit assessment should precede
further novel PPP experimentation. In the case of influenza, we anticipate that
such a risk assessment will show that the risks are unjustifiable. Given the risk of
a global pandemic posed by such experiments, this risk assessment should be
part of a broader international discussion involving multiple stakeholders and
not dominated by those with an interest in performing or funding such
research.
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are unique benefits to novel PPP experi-
ments, do they justify the risks entailed?
This concept, too, is partially incorporated
in the HHS frameworks, which permit
funding of H5N1 [33] or H7N9 [34,35]
transmissibility gain-of-function experi-
ments only if ‘‘there are no feasible
alternative methods to address the same
scientific question in a manner that poses
less risk than does the proposed approach’’
[33]. The Nuremberg Code suggests a
broader criterion: that PPP experiments
should be performed if the public health
benefits envisaged cannot be obtained by
safer methods. We argue that alternative
scientific approaches are not only less
risky, but also more likely to generate
results that can be readily translated into
public health benefits.
Challenges in Translating
Understanding of Influenza
Transmission into Public Health
Practice
Proponents of PPP experimentation cite
two main benefits of such studies: improv-
ing our interpretation of surveillance data
to detect dangerous viruses and facilitating
vaccine development against future natu-
ral pandemics. Both claims have been
disputed. The vaccine claim has been
denied by vaccine developers, who note
that many, if not all, vaccines have been
developed without a detailed molecular
understanding of transmission [36]. Advo-
cates of PPP experimentation further
argue that creating potentially pandemic
strains of a particular virus, e.g., A/H5N1,
could facilitate the production and stock-
piling of vaccines against that variant.
However, given that PPP experiments
inevitably consider only a few possible
genetic pathways to transmissibility, and
that the precise correspondence between
transmissibility in the ferret model and
human transmissibility remains uncer-
tain, we can never know whether PPP
experimentation would hit upon the
antigenic composition of the next pan-
demic strain that will emerge from nature.
Indeed, as described below, it is clear that
there is no one-to-one mapping between a
few genetic changes in a virus and its
transmissibility. By contrast, universal in-
fluenza vaccines currently in preclinical
and clinical trials [37] may, with further
development, prove to be more worthwhile
to stockpile for the purposes of pandemic
preparedness than an assortment of vac-
cines targeting antigenic variants manufac-
tured via PPP experimentation.
Current surveillance is likely inadequate
to detect an emerging pandemic strain
before it is too late [29,38], regardless of
any warnings that PPP experimentation
might generate about potentially worri-
some mutations. Between 2008 and 2013,
over 1,580 highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza (almost all H5N1) outbreaks, involv-
ing over 5 million birds, were reported to
the World Organisation for Animal
Health [39]. The US National Center for
Biotechnology Information Influenza Vi-
rus Resource [40] received about 1,400
complete or partial avian H5N1 virus
sequences over this period [41]. Most of
these sequences were over eight months
old by the time they were publicly
available in the Influenza Virus Resource.
Similar considerations apply to GISAID’s
EpiFlu Database, the other major influen-
za virus sequence database [42]. Given
that birds [43], like humans [44], harbor a
genetically diverse quasispecies of influen-
za variants, it is highly unlikely that such
limited surveillance could detect a pan-
demic viral sequence and, furthermore,
spur effective mitigation actions, before
the worrisome variant was already wide-
spread in birds. As an example of the
limited public health response even when
a dangerous virus has been observed,
consider the global response to H7N9
avian influenza, which has proven
zoonotic potential and has probably been
repeatedly transmitted from human to
human [45]. Isolates from human cases
reveal efficient binding to human sialic
acid receptors and airborne transmission
in ferrets [9] and guinea pigs [46]. These
indicators of pandemic potential are much
stronger than sequence comparisons with
engineered viruses could provide, yet most
live bird markets in China remain open,
and human cases continue to emerge [47].
Given these realities, it is difficult to
envision how a surveillance signal alone
would prompt swifter actions than these
existing warning signs for H7N9 have. In
short, the benefits for public health of the
scientific findings from PPP experimenta-
tion are speculative at best.
Epistatic Interactions in
Influenza Genetics: A Challenge
to Predicting Complex
Phenotypes
A further challenge to realizing public
health benefits from PPP experimentation
is that the predictability of phenotype from
viral sequence is complex [38,48,49], as
demonstrated by a recent assessment [50]
of the generality of mutations that con-
ferred human receptor binding in engi-
neered ferret-transmissible H5N1 strains.
When these mutations were introduced
into the genetic background of more
recent avian isolates of H5N1, affinity to
human receptors was lost [50]. Instead,
the phenotype of any mutation depends on
interactions with its genetic background, a
phenomenon known as epistasis that is
observed broadly in nature and in influ-
enza viruses specifically [51,52] (Table 1).
Thus, it is unlikely that a catalog of
mutations could inform reliable predic-
tions of transmission phenotype in circu-
lating strains.
Alternative Approaches: Safer
and More Promising
The prominent role of epistasis in
influenza biology suggests that alternative
approaches to studying the phenotypic
impact of mutations on mammalian trans-
missibility would be not only less risky, but
also more informative. In vivo replication
and transmission of influenza in humans
depend on myriad interdependent factors,
including the binding affinity between
hemagglutinin and human sialic acids,
the ability of the virion to fuse with the
endosomal membrane at the appropriate
pH and temperature, as well as the
stability of various viral proteins
[11,51,53,54]. Each of these traits, in turn,
is not simply determined by the presence
or absence of individual amino acids at
Box 2. Gain of Function: What’s in a Name?
The recent ferret transmission experiments with influenza A viruses have been
termed ‘‘gain of function’’ experiments because they involve engineering viruses
that gain transmissibility in ferrets. Gain of function is a common and important
approach in biological experimentation, and is not by itself cause for concern [58].
However, the elevated concern over these experiments arises from the particular
function that is gained. Ferret transmission is thought to be a good [59,60] (albeit
imperfect [61,62]) model for human-to-human transmission. Consequently, strains
resulting from selection for heightened ferret transmission are likely to be
similarly transmissible by humans via respiratory droplets, a prerequisite for
pandemic spread. In combination with demonstrated virulence for humans, this
particular gain of function presents unique risks and raises special ethical issues.
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erties arising from the interaction of many
sites within and between proteins [50,51].
Consequently, the challenge of predicting
transmissibility hinges on understanding
the genetic determinants of each trait,
coupled with the interactions of the traits
from which the higher-level phenotype of
transmissibility arises. An array of safer
approaches (Table 2) to studying influenza
pathogenesis and transmission focus on
dissecting these interactions. Some ap-
proaches start with sequence analysis and
molecular dynamics modeling, which are
intrinsically safe. The experimental evalu-
ation of hypotheses raised by such studies
may use viral components rather than
the entire infectious virus, making these
experiments simultaneously safer and more
precise and mechanistic than engineering
PPPs. Furthermore, these approaches are
typically less costly than PPP experimenta-
tion, facilitating phenotypic evaluation of a
greater diversity and abundance of genetic
variants. Ultimately, studies with intact
viruses will be necessary for a full under-
standing of human transmissibility, a
Table 1. Evidence of strong epistasis: examples of mutations in influenza A viruses and their varying phenotypes that are
dependent on genetic background.
Mutation Predicted Phenotype (Background) Other Phenotype (Background)
PB2 E627K Elevated virulence, transmissibility (H5N1,
H1N1, H7N7, etc.) [63–66]
Unaffected virulence or transmissibility (H1N1pdm) [67]; decreased fitness
(older H5N1) [66]
NA H275Y Oseltamivir resistance, fitness crippled (H1N1) [68,69] Oseltamivir resistance, fitness increased in absence of drug (H1N1) [68,70]
HA LS, 158,224,226 Mammalian transmission (H5N1 from Indonesia
and Viet Nam) [1,2]
No switch to mammalian sialic acid binding (H5N1 from Egypt) [50]
Polybasic HA cleavage site High avian pathogenicity (many H5 and H7
viruses) [71,72]
Low avian pathogenicity (four H5 isolates) [73]
HA, hemagglutinin; NA, neuraminidase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001646.t001
Table 2. Safer approaches to studying human adaptation of influenza A viruses, and more generally to improving vaccines and
therapeutics.
Approach Examples Scientific Benefits
Molecular dynamical modeling of influenza
proteins and interactions with inhibitors and
receptors
Analysis of adaptive changes in HA of H1N1pdm [74],
lipid tail protrusion as a determinant of HA–membrane
fusion [75], and identifying determinants of inhibitor-
resistant NA [76]
Biophysical basis for complex phenotypes
In vitro studies of specific properties required
for human adaptation, using single proteins
Studies of H5 or H7 receptor binding to mammalian
versus human sialic acids [50,77]; studies of genetic
determinants of optimal pH of fusion by comparing
properties of natural isolates [11]
Higher throughput than in vivo studies; can study
more sequences and define motifs required for
binding, beyond individual mutations; ability to
assess generality of hypothesized determinants [54]
In vitro studies of genetic interactions between
loci in one or several viral proteins using
replication-incompetent viruses
Studies of epistatic interactions in nucleoprotein
[51] or between nucleoprotein and polymerase
[78] based on in vitro expression of markers and
stability measurements of proteins
Higher throughput; ability to link structure to
function; ability to test combinations of mutations
Sequence database comparisons of genetic
properties of human- and avian-adapted
viruses
Identify amino acid markers of host adaptation
and quantify the extent of adaptation to a
particular host [79,80]; search for markers of
human adaptation (established from earlier studies
without PPP production) in H7N9 viruses [63]
Very high throughput; future studies could use
novel analytic methods [81] to systematically
identify new markers associated with human
adaptation, which could then be tested
experimentally; focus on naturally viable mutations
Sequence and in vitro phenotypic comparisons
of human seasonal influenza isolates, zoonotic
isolates from infected humans, and avian isolates
Comparison of human and avian isolates of H7N9 [82];
comparison of viral shedding in ferrets of human
seasonal and pandemic versus avian H5N1 viruses [83]
Focus on naturally viable variants; higher
throughput; ability to test a wide range of
phenotypes
Experimental production and evaluation in animal
transmission models of reassortants or mutants of
seasonal influenza to identify genetic components
required for transmissibility, maintaining surface
proteins to which human immunity exists
Replacing M segment of H3N2 and H1N1 strains
with one from H1N1pdm to assess effect on
guinea pig transmission [84]; ferret transmission
assays of recombinant H1N2swine 6H1N1pdm
viruses to determine role of HA-NA balance [85]
Human transmissibility of parent viruses provide
‘‘natural’’ validation of animal model
Universal or broadly neutralizing influenza
vaccine research
HA stalk vaccines [86,87]; enhancing responses to
conserved proteins [88]; T cell vaccination and
improved adjuvants [89]; targeting universal NA
epitopes [90]
Successful vaccine could eliminate need for rapid
production of pandemic-specific vaccine and
seasonal revaccination; complementary technology
to other approaches
Studies of host factors using naturally
occurring viruses
Identification of host factors restricting pathogenicity
in animal models, in vitro, and via human genetics [91]
Potential therapeutic targets identified
Accelerating vaccine production Sequence-based design and cell culture manufacture
of influenza vaccine [92]
More rapid manufacture
HA, hemagglutinin; NA, neuraminidase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001646.t002
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evolutionary trajectory through which ex-
isting seasonal (former pandemic) viruses
became transmissible from avian precur-
sors is safer than PPP experimentation,
given that there is preexisting population
immunity to seasonal strains, the products
of such evolution.
More generally, it should be remem-
bered that the public health goal is to
curtail influenza pandemics and seasonal
transmission [55,56]. Exploring basic bi-
ology is just one scientific means to this
end. Other approaches, such as develop-
ing universal influenza vaccines and novel
antiviral drugs and strategies to enhance
host responses, as well as improving
technologies for rapid vaccine manufac-
ture, are being pursued without risks of
PPP release (Table 2).
Paths Forward
We urge that proposals for any future
experiments on PPPs be evaluated accord-
ing to quantitative risk–benefit analysis
guided by the principles of the Nuremberg
Code. Indeed, HHS frameworks require a
risk–benefit analysis to approve gain-of-
function experimentation on H5N1 and
H7N9 [33–35] viruses, yet no such
analysis has been made public, if it has
been conducted. Other funding and reg-
ulatory agencies, which have not yet called
for a risk–benefit analysis, should require
one as well. In biomedical grant review
processes, proposals compete for limited
funding, and most proposals that could
advance science are never supported,
because of budget constraints or because
funding agencies conclude that there are
more promising, safer, more humane, or
otherwise superior ways to achieve scien-
tific goals. PPP experimentation poses a
significant risk to public health, arguably
the highest level of risk posed by any
biomedical research. Such experiments
should be assessed on the basis of their
marginal benefits, compared to those of
safer approaches. In the case of influenza,
given the higher throughput and lower
cost of alternatives, we believe the benefits
of alternative approaches will be greater
than those of novel PPP experimentation,
yet without the risks–thereby negating the
justification for taking such risks. Similarly,
careful consideration should be given to
analyses of novel PPP experiments beyond
the study of influenza, as these are
proposed. Funders and regulators should
evaluate the balance of risks and benefits
before further novel PPP experiments are
undertaken.
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